Bioterrorism Threat Weapons
“Bioterrorism is a real threat to your country. It’s a danger to every country that loves freedom. Terrorist groups seek biological weapons; we know some rogue states curently have them….It’s important that people confront these legitimate threats to our country and plan future emergencies.”
-President George W. Bush June 12, 2002
Biological weapons are one of the biggest threats we deal with today. They will be potentially just as deadly as nuclear weapons and will leave a location contaminated for weeks. Despite this however, the threat of biological weapons does not seem to be a major priority of our current administration. There appears to be a significant rush to implement counter-terrorism plans that give attention to more conventional method of attacks and more especially those attacks that we have already experienced. As a result, we see very much improvement in the screening of airline travellers and the regulation of classic explosives, but no more regulation of biological weapons, dispersion devices, or the implementation of better response methods. Therefore, more should be done to prevent biological episodes and prepare our country to respond in the event there is one.
According to the Terrorism Know-how Basic, since nineteen sixty eight there were a total of thirteen incidents including biological weapons with forty-six accidents, and six fatalities. Of these thirteen incidents, nine of these have taken place in the United States, challenging accidents, and five out of six of the deaths all occurring in the usa aswell. If these figures are examined valence shell definition in a general sense and in comparison to other weapons used in terrorists episodes (bombs, fire, firearms, etc) then the trend of biological terrorism will not seem to be very important. However, the reality is that the more technologically advanced we become globally, the better biological weapons and their dispersion systems become, and the higher the risk is for an assault. We are currently in a day and time where scientific discovery, and improvements in biology are putting us at risk for an attack from a terrorist group, or even an individual with usage of biological weapons and a grudge.
In order to correct our current system, revision of our current policies must be done, as well as creation of new policies and procedures to mitigate the threat. This paper provides details on our current guidelines, how the problems with out current policies can be fixed, and a risk evaluation of the Brazos Valley with certain focus on the Texas A good&M University System.
The following will be the policies which may have been developed in response to the threat of biological weapons. All polices concerning biological weapons should have two parts: avoidance of a biological weapon strike, and response after a biological assault. While every is important alone, together they make a thorough plan to create guidelines around. Before any recommendations can be made, nevertheless, our current policies must be referred to and judged against the threat we currently face.
There are three main policies and ideas concerning biological weapons that contain come from the White Residence. They are Homeland Protection Presidential Directive 10, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21, and Project Bioshield. Together these are made to provide us with optimum protection and response regarding a biological threat.
Homeland Secureness Presidential Directive 10 (Biodefense for the 21st Century):
Homeland Secureness Presidential Directive 10 offers four major goals as outlined by the White Residence: threat awareness, avoidance and coverage, surveillance and recognition, and response and recovery. Each one of these is an integral area of the overall plan.
In buy for our government to prepare for a biological strike, we must know the type of the threat. This is where the “Threat Recognition” pillar comes into play. This pillar seeks to supply our government with the ability to use technology and intelligence to supply the most sensible appraisal of our current threat. The idea of threat awareness allows us to create functional policies especially designed around our current threat. There are three totals parts of the threat consciousness pillar: biological warfare related intelligence, assessments, and anticipation of near future threats.
Biological warfare related cleverness may be the name given to the process of using the intelligence community (Central Intelligence Company, National Security Firm, and others) to assemble all information regarding biological weapons. This might involve abroad missions for intelligence gathering purposes, creation of systems to analyze collected data, and the dissemination of this data to all important get-togethers. Biological warfare related cleverness also incorporates Crimson Teaming, a term indicating the crew in a preparedness training (similar to a war game) whose role is certainly to simulate enemy strategies. “Red Teaming efforts are being used to understand new scientific trends which may be exploited by our adversaries to develop biological weapons also to help position intelligence enthusiasts before our problem.” (www.whitehouse.gov)
Assessments are the second element of the threat consciousness pillar. “The Unites States takes a continuous, formal process for conducting routine features assessments to steer prioritization of our on-going investments in biodefense-related research, development, planning and preparedness.” (www.whitehose.gov) The Department of Homeland Reliability will be made accountable for gathering information and creation of periodical assessments and making recommendations of division of information predicated on the assessment.
The anticipation of upcoming threats part asserts that the necessity to stay current with existing technology is of superb importance. It enables the government the government to anticipate and prepare for the emergence of brand-new threats (www.whitehouse.gov). How these assessments are to be done and what specifically is to be included in them, is not explained in the Light House’s edition of Homeland Reliability Presidential Directive ten however.
Prevention and Protection
The first component of the prevention and safeguard pillar is proactive avoidance. As explained by the White Property, “preventing biological weapons attacks is by far the most cost-effective approach to biodefense.” This will be accomplished by limiting gain access to of biological agents and dispersal methods to countries, groups, or individuals wanting to develop, produce, and use these agents. (www.whitehouse.gov) This will be achieved using law enforcement investigative approaches, diplomacy, and export controls. Agencies responsible for prevention will be the Department of State, Section of Defense, Department of Justice, and the cleverness community, but specific duties aren’t given.
The second element of prevention and protection is crucial infrastructure protection. The directive explains that cover of critical infrastructure, specifically in the case of those that will be important after an assault (public health, food, normal water, energy, agriculture, transport, etc.) should be protected. Once again, details concerning how this is to be done aren’t given, only that it ought to be done.
Surveillance and Detection
The first element of the surveillance and recognition pillar is attack caution. This might entail the development of an assault warning system, similar to serious weather warning devices, “which speedily recognizes and characterizes the dispersal of biological agents.” The logic behind this component of surveillance and detection is that an efficient and effective response can be attached to counter the danger if the biological agent used in an attack is able to get detected and characterized earlier.
The second element of surveillance and detection is attribution. The opportunity to attribute an assault to a particular country, group, or person can help authorities to deter attacks with the guarantee of serious repercussions to the group or region that perpetrates the assault. The recently created National Bioforensic Research Center of the National Biodefense Evaluation and Countermeasure Center is accountable for the examination of the biological agent, and interpretation of info to determine responsibility. This concept has been tried out for lesser crimes (three-strike laws) with varied degrees of success.
Response and Recovery
The components of the response and restoration attack are many. But this is important as the response after an assault is an enormous intricate undertaking. This portion of the Directive 10 is composed of: response preparation, mass casualty good care, risk conversation, medical countermeasure advancement, and decontamination.
Response planning is the most important section of the response and restoration pillar. Without a reasonable plan of strike, nothing can be accomplished. Evidence of this idea is seen in the days and weeks following Hurricane Katrina, when recovery initiatives were mishandled by Federal government Emergency Management Company due in large part to ill-preparedness. As part of this component, the ideas are likewise to be tested regularly at the local, state, and federal level. Mass casualty care, decontamination, and medical countermeasure all get together in preventing loss of life after an strike. To ensure that all of these that occurs, there must be funding in regions of research pertaining to countermeasures of biological brokers, and also funding in the public health arena in a way that all medical facilities are adequately prepared to handle this event. This includes stocking medical features with countermeasures and keeping them up to date with terrorism activities with a communication network.
Homeland Reliability Presidential Directive 21
Released October two-thousand seven, Homeland Reliability Presidential Directive twenty-one in a much more comprehensive release of the response and recover pillar of Homeland Protection Presidential Directive ten. It delves into specifically how we go about preparing for the aftermath of a biological strike. The five significant priorities / goals when contemplating preparedness happen to be: preparedness for all potential catastrophic wellness situations; vertical and horizontal coordination across levels of authorities, jurisdictions and disciplines; a regional method of health preparedness; engagement of the personal sector, academia, and various other nongovernmental entities in preparedness and response work; and the important functions of people, families, and communities. To perform these priorities, Homeland Security Presidential Directive twenty-one outlines many actions that must definitely be implemented to mount an effective response to a biological assault. These are mostly exactly like those described in Homeland Protection Presidential Directive ten; even so, the greatest difference is in the case of Homeland Secureness Presidential Directive twenty-one, deadlines happen to be established concerning when these ought to be done.
Biosurveillance demands the establishment of a “national epidemiological surveillance system for human health.” This would entail an electric network linking federal, express and local public wellness assets. This technique would also have to protect patient privacy, while giving usage of those medical professionals most likely to touch the agents. This network would likewise incorporate keeping medical researchers abreast in what to consider in the form of symptoms. The deadline for this goal was one-hundred eighty days and nights, but only needed meetings to examine improvement.
Countermeasure stockpiling and distribution
Countermeasure stockpiling and distribution demands the creation of a plan to amass a way to obtain common countermeasures incorporating antibiotics, anti-virals and others. The countermeasure stockpiling and distribution portion of the directive mandates a template or arrange for these efforts will be created within nine weeks of its release time, but once again rhetorical analysis paper, does not explain accurately how anything is to be done, only that it ought to be within nine months.
Mass Casualty Care
Through a joint work between the Secretaries of Health insurance and Human Services, Protection, Veteran Affairs, and Homeland Secureness, authorities at the state, federal and private amounts are to provide feedback on “high-priority gaps in mass casualty care capabilities.” After this event, there is usually to be an analysis of the info in order to build a plan for mass
casualty health care after a biological strike. This plan would demand changes in out public health system specifically geared towards biodefense, and not towards improving our public health system as a whole.
Perhaps the most important component of Homeland Secureness presidential Directive 21, this section encourages engaging citizens in education and risk consciousness in the region of biological weapons. Civic leaders, citizens and family members are to be educated such that they are able to lessen a few of the risk within their respective areas.
The Project Bioshield Take action of 2004 was signed on June 21, 2004 by current President George W. Bush. Job Bioshield deals specifically with the production and the procurement of countermeasures from pharmaceutical companies. The signing of the Project Bioshield Action allowed for the creation of seventy-five million dosages of anthrax vaccines for stockpiling, development of botulinum antitoxin, and creation of a safer smallpox toxin. Project Bioshield is not designed to fix our problems, but solve a huge problem in having less response resources.
Problems with our current system and policies
Our current biological weapons guidelines consist typically of Homeland Protection Presidential Directives ten and twenty-one and the Job Bioshield Act. Mutually, they represent the virtually all comprehensive plan we’ve, but still flunk of featuring us with the coverage and reliability from what President Bush describes as a “true threat to our country.” While our current program provides a good base for a biological weapons defense policy, it has different important gaps. Our current plans display one key flaw in our biodefense plan: we know very well what to do, however, not how to complete it. In the overview of all three areas of our biodefense policy, there is absolutely no detailed plan of how to repair the holes in our system. Also, despite released in April two-thousand four, most of the objectives seen Homeland Protection Presidential Directive ten, will be yet incomplete; particularly in the case of the “Response and Recovery” objective. What this means is we aren’t following the plans we have set up to avoid and respond to bioterrorism. In two-thousand one, approximately one-half a billion dollars w as allocated to civilian biodefense. Every year since then, the spending has truly gone up with spending achieving approximately seven and one-half billion us dollars. (Schuler 88) We happen to be considerably further than we had been in two-thousand one, but nonetheless significantly without bio-terrorism security.
There are only a few things we currently lack, but they are very vital that you our security. Firstly we lack a good public health system. “The basic requirements of bioterrorism preparedness stay the essential tasks of public health- identifying unusual disease incidents, their trigger, and intervening to ease the situation” (Avery 284) The government is wanting to pump more resources right into a flawed system. Without a good public health program, any biodefense plan ultimately falls apart because our public health and wellbeing system is very important in response efforts.
Another big flaw in our system is the insufficient talented people. Having great policies and resources but lacking talented employees to place them into practice is unacceptable. Federal companies are losing potential staff members to the non-public sector when the demand for defense talent will to continue rise by as many as twenty-five percent through the year two-thousand ten. (Partnership for Public Service 224) Policies cannot be apply without talented people leading them. It’s estimated that practically half of the federal government employees in occupations critical to out biodefense will meet the requirements to retire within the next five years. (Executive Overview 224).
An additional significant mistake with this current system is insufficient action. While our current plans aren’t perfect, they do provide a very good base method. Why are we not where we have to be? The reason could be budget worries, or biological weapons are less of a priority than they must be, but whatever the reason why, creation of guidelines without adding them into actions leaves us at risk. In Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21, it demands open public outreach and education to see the general public as to the risks of biological weapons, and how to reach regarding the attack, but it has not been completed. In Homeland Protection Presidential Directive 10, a biosurveillance system is proposed to hold our open public health facilities informed as to emerging threats and suspicious incidents in other parts of the country. As the directive premiered in two-thousand four, it has not been accomplished.
Proposed Biological Terrorism Avoidance and Response Plan
Our current guidelines and recent activities have presented us with a good foundation to build a solid biological weapons avoidance and response plan on. However, as a way to mitigate the threat more must be done. My plan has the potential to fill in the majority of the holes in our current policy / system. I propose several improvements in out current system and guidelines. My proposed will emphasize all aspects of security (prevention and response). Our current people health seems to be the most important area of the equation, so this is normally where my biodefense program will begin.
In buy to mount an efficient response in the aftermath of an assault, we should have a well-organized open public health system. This particular the main plan would demand government-funded upgrades in public areas health facilities. As explained previously, an analysis of our current general public health system demonstrates “upgrading public health features for broad based-surveillance avoids the risk of tunnel vision that is inherent in the bioterrorism-specific approach.” (Avery 285) Upgrades to your public health facilities will include greater stockpiles of antibiotics, anti-virals, and additional countermeasures. According to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21, “few if any cities are presently able to meet the target of dispensing countermeasures to their entire inhabitants within forty-eight hours following the decision to do so.” These stockpiles ought to be large enough to aid in the response after most any disaster, and found in such places that they may be sent to affected areas within twenty-four hours. Proximity to a significant metropolitan area should not be a problem in response attempts. This phase would also require coordination with biotechnology and pharmaceutical corporations to coordinate and distribute materials of counter-measures to several regions in each state. Other tasks of our current public health system include vaccination of general public. This would be advanced beyond our current status.
The next step in upgrading out open public health system is personnel training and education. Biological weapons can make use of some of the most deadly bacteria and viruses in the world. Medical personnel ought to be trained in the recognition and treatment of the most deadly agents. This would necessitate training supplied by the guts for Disease Control and other similarly competent exclusive sector facilities and professionals. While many biological agents present with peculiar symptoms, many present with flu-just like symptoms and will be quickly confused with other fewer lethal illnesses. All of this information must make its way to not only our medical doctors and nurses, but those involved with public health.
The last stage of my public overall health plan is the creation of a centralized network open to all public health facilities. This network would be created and taken care of by the government using such agencies as the Center for Disease Control and the National Institute of Overall health. This network / data source would monitor the progression of illnesses and symptoms through the entire country. It would also serve as a link between facilities. In case of an attack in one section of the country, all facilities can be put on alert almost instantly. This could lead to significantly less deaths through the aftermath of an assault, and aid in the day to day functions of our country’s general public health system.
Homeland Secureness Presidential Directive 10 is definitely a general diagram for both prevention and response. While it outlines both aspects, it generally does not go into great detail as to how its plans should be accomplished. The same can be said for Homeland Reliability Presidential Directive 21. Our major policies do not give a detailed photo of what out primary response plan is. We cannot organize a functional response if we do not possess a nation-wide incident response plan for a biological attack. Hence Phase II will be the creation of an intensive plan that is in a position to be utilized in all regions of the united states. One standardized program would alleviate any indecisiveness when deciding how to proceed for a particular region and also make training easier. With one standardized strategy there is absolutely no question of what the neighborhood government is to accomplish, everything is planned and only should be executed.
This plan could have three key goals: defining authority after an attack, setup a timeline for when response work have to be completed, and provide a basis for training first responders and different charged with response. In the aftermath of an attack authority is always a concern. Because agencies often have different ideas how response should proceed, authority should be defined before an assault ever happens. The two options for authority are federal and condition with each having their positive aspects. Federal firms have near limitless information in comparison with state agencies. They are usually able to procure and implement necessary resources considerably faster. State agencies have the benefit of local knowledge. Local knowledge of a particular region and its own working can be an invaluable asset during circumstances of disaster. Federal firms cannot possibly all aspects of a particular region and so this responsibility falls to the state government. State governments also the advantage of having the capacity to react more quickly as a result of their close proximity to the affected area. So the best compromise between your two will be joint authority shared between your state government (governor, mayors, city managers, etc.), and a representative of the government specified by the president. Just because a plan will already maintain place prior to an attack, the state government would have a definitive game plan within the days following an attack. Following the government representative arrives, they are able to are a cohesive team to plan the very best course of action.
Along with defining authority, the national response program should define timelines concerning when certain actions are to be taken. Phase one of this plan would make sure that countermeasures were available in the function of a biological strike. This timeline would create when these countermeasures should be given,
Our current president provides described biological weapons as an extremely serious threat. Mitigation of the threat may be accomplished, but needs specialized actions from personnel been trained in biology together with investigative techniques. Stage II would demand the creation of a company dedicated to the risk of bioterrorism. The initial step of phase II is finding people with different experience (science, investigation, cleverness gather, etc.) to operate in this agency. Bioterrorism is a much different threat than most conventional methods of terrorism. To mount a superior defense / offense, it takes a deep understanding of biology, biochemistry, virology, and many other biological
sciences. Investigating offenses regarding such agents cannot be done without the proper knowledge and practical experience. Most agencies currently tasked with counter-terrorism do not have the requisite staff with research backgrounds, nor the means to handle their other duties and the danger from bioterrorism. The need for people with know-how in those areas provides been established as is definitely yet unfulfilled. We can not properly stop a risk if those that will be tasked with this responsibility have no idea everything there is to learn about the threat. The initial step would be to obtain the right employees for the organization. The agency would be produced up of doctors, scientists, policy makers, first responders, investigators (law enforcement), security employees, and any other required personnel to mount a thorough response.
The next step would be to define the obligations of the company. I propose this firm be in charge of investigation of biological weapons threats, regulation of biological brokers, working in tandem with intelligence companies here and abroad, and working with different countries to insure the regulation of stated materials there aswell. These obligations are no small process. They will require many hours of cleverness gathering, diplomacy, investigation, and police. The scope of this agency would be extensive, but nonetheless well at your fingertips if done correctly. This agency would need to utilize techniques used by the Central Intelligence Organization, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, and many other similar agencies to be able to reach such large goals.
Phase IV would contain public education / outreach. The group of folks most vulnerable to biological attacks is every day residents. If we are to safeguard the public, then they must be educated concerning risks, current counter procedures, and how to proceed in the case of an attack. This is where the educational outreach courses would enter. They would have to be non-invasive as in a pamphlet provided to each individual after a doctors check out, or educational clips provided to employers to be displayed at career orientations. Using this idea could save us billions of dollars in expenditures subsequent to an attack by saving much time and effort in organizing and coordinating public actions.
Phase V would consist of training those people accountable for first response. Our first of all line of defense is not government agencies, but the people who happen to be closest to the assault; this will be local police, firefighters, and local open public health staff. Current native law enforcement agencies are unprepared and unknowledgeable about probably biological attacks plus they of all responders will be well versed in what to expect and how to react after a biological strike. Period V would mandate training of most probably first responders at least one time a year. This training would include simulated attacks in a simulated environment. All those that would be involved in the response efforts would be trained in how to proceed, and then using that training to a simulated attack. This training would also help the public rest easier knowing that their first responders are prepared for the opportunity of a biological assault.
Advantages vs. Disadvantages
Advantages: The greatest durability of the proposed program is its comprehensiveness. This plan covers all aspects of biological terrorism (prevention and response) as well as addressing the existing holes in our system. It provides us with the perfect response, along with directing preventative methods ahead of an attack. Agencies focused on specific purposes have a long history of performance as can be seen in the Center for Disease Control and various other similar agencies. This course of action could not work if the responsibilities were placed after another agency previously tasked with different unrelated obligations. Biological weapons will be too great a risk to be relegated to one of the many tasks of an agency with a great many other missions. Also compared to outsourcing these duties to the non-public sector, this proposal signify a method of maintaining security, but also retaining faith in out federal government. Most citizens wish to know that their authorities is more than with the capacity of protecting them from important secureness threats. This proposal has the benefit of allowing all responsibilities to stay in house such that there is absolutely no division of tasks between government and exclusive. This proposal also permits advancements in out current countermeasure stockpiles, a public even more worried about their own safe practices, and a standardized response system such that
Disadvantages: The greatest thing working against a company of the type is price. As stated previously, biodefense funding has truly gone up significantly yearly since two-thousand one. (Schuler 88) An idea of this magnitude would be costly. Also, creating of another company has the possibility of earning an currently confusing counter-terrorism more perplexing.
Brazos Valley threat assessment
All the issues that plague the nation in reference to a biological weapons risk happen to be compounded in the Brazos valley Area. The main industry in your community is Texas A&M University, which is also could possibly be considered a higher value target.
A threat assessment can be viewed as having three factors: the threat to a target, the target’s vulnerability to the threat, and the consequences if the target be successfully attacked. (Willis 16) In this regard the risk assessment regarding the Brazos Valley can be three-parted.
Threat to the target:
According to the CDC, bioterrorism agents are typically divided into three categories: types A, B, and C (www.cdc.gov). Category A organisms involve biological brokers with both a higher prospect of adverse public health impact and that likewise have a serious prospect of large-scale dissemination. Category B brokers are moderately simple to disseminate and also have low mortality costs. Category C brokers are pathogens that could be engineered for mass dissemination because they are easy to produce and also have potential for high morbidity or mortality. Predicated on information gathered from interviews with Associate Chief Freddy Komar of the Bryan Police Department and Doctor Garry Adams of the Texas A&M University School of Veterinary Medicine, the largest threat to Texas A&M and the surrounding areas may be the dissemination of a Category A organism, more specifically one that could be very easily ported to an aerosol approach to dispersal. With a powerful dispersal in an extremely populated and confined region or event such as a football video game at Kyle Discipline, the destructive probable is massive.
As an agricultural staple, the Brazos Valley Place
Target’s Vulnerability to Threat:
The government of the Brazos Valley functions in a continuous express of alertness according to an Interview with Mr. Bill Can. Using the Texas A&M University Engineering Expansion Support (TEEX), the Brazos Valley trains emergency personnel from across the world at the request of their home agency. TEEX uses a sizable training facility to supply simulated disasters so as to prepare the trainees for just about any type of disaster. TEEX is different from other agencies for the reason that it offers the most realistic training found in the country, if not the globe. However, this only manages the aftermath. Leading line of defense is the local police branches. In speaking with the associate chief of police, I came across that while Texas A good&M is normally a veritable hub for disaster training, the first line of defense against bio-terrorist episodes (local police) are not trained in what to do to avoid local terrorist episodes, identify probably terrorist behavior, and how to properly cope with someone suspected to be a terrorist. This responsibility falls primarily to the closest FBI field office which is located ninety miles aside in Houston, Texas. Both the Bryan and College Stations Police Departments be based upon an agency ninety miles away, and this is a huge error that both departments need to fix immediately.
Consequences Should the Target be Efficiently Attacked:
Texas A&M University is probably the most likely concentrate on for a bio-terrorist attack in the Brazos Valley Location. It has a huge concentration of people, a whole lot of open space, and a student body wholly unacquainted with their surroundings. Texas A&M is a location where many different people from many different parts of the world co-exist in one large area. It is an wide open campus with a police that is too little to monitor such a huge area with so various places to cover up. A bio-terrorist strike would at the very worst kill thousands of people depending on the technique of dispersal, organism, and weather. It could also cripple the market of the state of Texas for a long time to come.
The most important proven fact that the interviewees could provide me was that the fight against terrorism consists of two major tasks; strong training and education. These concepts are incredibly rarely addressed in both the case of the general public, and more importantly, the local law enforcement agencies. This is what comprises the largest portion of our risk, and if increased, the Brazos Valley’s already low risk issue would plummet a lot more.
How to repair the Problem:
The deficiencies aren’t hard to repair, but as explained by Doctor Adams, politics and money get in the way. What is needed is usually: A federally regulated and funded system with common methods for all the states, but also a person expert in each declare that has the capacity to cater response techniques to each area. The machine that is used now is different for every state, plus some work much better than others. As referred to above, the incident commander program that Texas uses is very useful, but as with everything has faults. I feel a uniformed system is just about the best way to reduce the faults. Funding, as always, is essential to train personnel and hire experienced folks who are capable of handling large and dense populations. To improve the allocation of homeland protection resources and thereby to lessen loss of life and home to terrorism or minimize poor investments in homeland security measures if attacks usually do not take place, it is essential to have good estimates of the terrorism risk to which distinct regions or groupings are uncovered (manuscript). Risk and event models based on population size and density will be needed in order to properly educate the community. Especially those communities that are in greater risks should be recognized and educated with network outreach and tv set programs on native stations. Training of local police and emergency response organizations would greatly improve not merely the response to attacks, but also prevention of episodes by helping them identify possible targets, suspect behavior, and different precursors to an attack.
Avery, George. Bioterrorism, Fear, and Public Wellbeing Reform: Matching a Policy Solution to the Wrong Window. “Public Administration Review” Vol. 64, No. 3, May/June 2004 275-288
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Partnership for Public Support. Homeland Insecurity: Setting up the Expertise to guard America from Terrorism. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Approach, Practice, and Research. Vol. 1 No. 3, 2003 223-224.
Willis, Henry; Morral, Andrew; Kelly, Terrence; Medby, Jamison. “Estimating Terrorism Risk.” Rand Corporation. (2005): 1-56.
Komar, Freddie. Personal Interview. 28 June 2007.
May, Costs. Personal Interview. 26 July 2007.
Adams, Garry. Personal Interview. 2 Aug. 2007.
Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases. July 2007. Center for Disease Control. 30 November 2007. .